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Oil and Gas: Roye Realty v. Watson: Are Royalties
Owed on All Take-or-Pay Settlements in Oklahoma?
L Introduction
Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, agreements by purchasers of gas to take
minimum quantities over a specified time or to make minimum periodic payments
to a gas producer, even though no gas is actually being taken by the purchaser, were
commonly used in Oklahoma and other gas-producing states. These agreements,
typically called "take-or-pay" agreements, have been the subject of numerous law-
suits.' The issue to be discussed in this note concerns whether royalties are due
under typical oil and gas leases, in the absence of production, on payments in
settlement of take-or-pay claims when they are received by a producer.2
Specifically, this note will examine a recent Oklahoma Court of Appeals case,
Roye Realty v. Watson,3 in which the court held in a broad, sweeping opinion that
royalties must be paid on take-or-pay payments which do not involve production,
including those made in settlement of take-or-pay litigation and those made as
consideration for so-called contract "buy-outs"4 or "buy-downs,"' when gas
purchasers and producers agree to release obligations or lower contract prices to
better approximate existing market rates.
Roye Realty is a case of first impression in Oklahoma and the issue it presents
is one of enormous importance to both Oklahoma producers and royalty owners.6
In light of the current attention and concern given to this issue, parts I through V
of this note will review previous case law and the historical developments leading
up to the Roye Realty decision. Part VI will examine the various arguments
available to the producer-seller (or lessee) involved in a take-or-pay dispute, and
part VII will deal with the arguments of the royalty interest owner (or lessor) who
1. A "take-or-pay" provision requires a purchaser to take a specified amount of gas during each
contract period or pay for that quantity even if not taken in full. See Diamond Shamrock Exploration
Co. v. Hodel, 853 F.2d 1159, 1161 (5th Cir. 1988); HOWARD R. WILLIAMS & CHARLES J. MEYERS,
MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERMS 1233 (1991). An example of an actual take-or-pay provision may be
found in Wagner & Brown v. ANR, 837 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1988).
2. The focus of this note will not be on the royalty treatment of a typical take-or-pay payment or
settlement followed by the taking of make-up gas as addressed in William H. White, The Right To
Recover Royalties on Natural Gas Take-or-Pay Settlements, 41 OKLA. L. REV. 663 (1988).
3. Roye Realty v. Watson, No. 76,848 (Okla. Ct. App. filed July 14, 1992), cert. granted, No.
76,848 (Okla. Jan. 11, 1993).
4. A contract "buy-out" has been defined by the Oklahoma Tax Commission as a payment to
terminate a gas sale agreement. General Counsel, Okla. Tax Comm'n, General Position Statement on the
Application of § 1009(g) to Take-or-Pay Settlement Proceeds (Feb. 7, 1990).
5. The Oklahoma Tax Commission defines a contract "buy-down" as a payment to modify the gas
sale agreement. Id.
6. Presently, the producer involved in Roye Realty is seeking petition for review by the Oklahoma
Supreme Court. Amicus curiae briefs have been filed by, among others, the Oklahoma Mineral Owners
Association, and the National Association of Royalty Owners (royalty owners' group), and the Oklahoma
Independent Petroleum Association (producers' group).
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seeks royalties on the payments in settlement of take-or-pay litigation. Finally, part
VIII of this note will present what is believed to be the correct approach that should
be followed in the State of Oklahoma.
11. Development of Take-or-Pay Litigation
The demand for natural gas is cyclical and is dependent upon weather and
economic conditions. Further, exploration efforts are extremely expensive and risky
and may not be pursued if gas sale opportunities are uncertain. Therefore, producers
often seek to obtain promises from their pipeline purchasers in a take-or-pay
provision that they will either "take" certain minimum amounts of gas or "pay" the
producer for the amounts not taken.7 Usually, a buyer has a period of time in which
to make up any deficiencies in gas which should have been taken earlier but was
not. This is called a "recoupment" or "make-up" provision, and when delivered the
gas is called "recoupment gas" or "make-up gas."' A make-up provision may
require the buyer to pay any increase in the price of gas that may have occurred
between the earlier take-or-pay payments and the actual taking of the gas.9 It is
well accepted that royalties are payable on take-or-pay payments when make-up gas
is delivered.'0
Take-or-pay payments compensate the producer-seller for being willing and able
to provide a certain amount of gas and are intended to assure him of a minimal cash
flow. The payments also provide the pipeline-buyer flexibility in the amount of gas
taken in order to control gas reserves to meet their needs in the absence of an open
market for natural gas." Both producers and pipelines miscalculated in negotiating
take-or-pay clauses during the gas shortages of the 1970s and 1980s. When gas
demand and prices declined dramatically, gas purchasers faced take-or-pay liabilities
totaling billions of dollars."2 When many gas purchasers simply refused to take or
to pay, many producers filed suit. Others amended their gas contracts." Many
lawsuits and threatened lawsuits were settled. 4 Many take-or-pay claims have,
from the 1980s to the present, been settled for either lump-sum payments or through
7. White, supra note 2, at 663.
8. Diamond Shamrock, 853 F.2d at 1161.
9. Bruce M. Kramer, Royalty Obligations Under the Gun - The Effect of Take-or-Pay Clauses
on the Duty To Make Royalty Payments, 39 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N 5.1, 5.4 (1988).
10. A typical royalty clause provides for payment when there is production. Diamond Shamrock,
853 F.2d at 1161.
11. Kramer, supra note 9, at 5.5; Frey v. Amoco Prod. Co., 603 So. 2d 166, 175 (La. 1992).
12. White, supra note 2, at 664.
13. Id.
14. Id. At the time, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) took several actions which
reduced the ability of pipelines to force their customers to buy minimum amounts of gas while permitting
their customers to acquire cheaper gas, which placed the pipeline companies in the position of being
liable to producers, without compensating rights against their customers. The FERC's answer to the
problems thus created was to suggest that the pipeline companies "vigorously renegotiate" their problem
contracts with producers, waile the FERC retained the right to itself outlaw problem provisions if
renegotiations were not successful. See WILLIAM D. WATSON, THE GAS SELLER'S COMPANION: A




renegotiations for contract buy-outs or buy-downs, without any actual delivery of
gas. 5 Since many of these settlements involve no actual gas production, lessees
and royalty owners alike were unsure of whether royalties were payable under oil
and gas leases which appear to call for royalties when gas is "produced." Therefore,
the issue of royalty obligation is of utmost importance. Roye Realty is the first
Oklahoma appellate decision to address this novel question of law.
III. Take-or-Pay Settlements
In Mesa Petroleum Co. v. U.S. Department of Interior,6 the royalty clause at
issue required the lessee "to pay the Lessor a royalty of 16 2/3 percent in amount
or value of production saved, removed, or sold from the leased area."'7 The gas
contract under which the lessee sold the gas had a minimum take-or-pay provision
with a seven-year make-up clause. After take-or-pay payments were made, some,
but not all, make-up gas credit was taken by the purchaser. The federal government,
as lessor, demanded royalty "on the unrecouped deficiency." The lessee argued that
royalty was due only on "production" under the royalty clause. The lessee also
relied on the language of an existing regulation stating that "under no circumstances
shall the value of production be less than the gross proceeds accruing to the lessee
from the disposition of the produced substances."' 8 The Federal District Court for
the Western District of Louisiana concluded that, given the fact that there had been
no production, under the language contained in the leases in question, the
government "has no statutory, regulatory, or contractual authority to collect royalties
on take-or-pay payments."'9 Mesa was consolidated on appeal with a similar case
involving Diamond Shamrock Exploration Co., resulting in the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals opinion in Diamond Shamrock Exploration Co. v. Hodel ° which
represents the majority view regarding take-or-pay payments.
In the case involving Diamond Shamrock Exploration Co., a lessee of federal
acreage received payment pursuant to a take-or-pay clause in its gas sales contract
with the pipeline-purchaser.2' The issue was'whether royalty was due on the
payment when the take-or-pay payment is received, even though the gas had not
actually been produced and taken. In each case consolidated on appeal, the contract
with the pipeline included a take-or-pay provision requiring the purchaser to take
a specified amount of gas during each contract year or pay for that quantity even
if not taken in full, and a make-up provision. The lessees in each case failed to pay
royalties on take-or-pay payments unless make-up gas had actually been taken.
15. See Associated Gas Distribs. v. FERC, 824 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1987); American Gas Ass'n v.
FERC, 888 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Associated Gas Distribs. v. FERC, 893 F.2d 349 (D.C. Cir.
1989).
16. 647 F. Supp. 1350 (W.D. La. 1986).
17. Id. at 1353.
18. 30 C.F.R. § 206.150 (1987).
19. Mesa Petroleum Co., 647 F. Supp. at 1353.
20. 853 F.2d 1159 (5th Cir. 1988).
21. The oil and gas lease in question provided for royalty on "crude oil, condensate, and natural gas
liquids produced on such lease." Id. at 1163.
19931
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The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that royalties are not due on "value in
the abstract," but only on the value of "production saved, removed or sold from the
leased property."' Consequently, the Fifth Circuit held that royalties are only owed
when there is actual production - a severance of minerals from the formation.'
The court stated that to reach any other conclusion would lead to absurd results.u
The federal government, as lessor, was certainly entitled to its proportionate share
of the fair market value of what turns out to be the actual make-up gas.' But, the
court reasoned that if the lessee-producer was forced to pay royalties when the take-
or-pay payment is made, it would then have to pay additional royalty due on any
increased fair market value at the time make-up gas is taken. 6 Conversely, the
court reasoned, if the price of gas drops, the purchaser could be due a refund and,
if the producer had already paid royalties, it would be placed in the position of
having to seek refunds from the royalty owners.' The court observed that
uncertainties would re;ult in any case where royalties are payable on the fair market
value of gas, and a take-or-pay payment is made but no gas is takenu With no
production there is nothing to value."
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held in Diamond Shamrock that take-or-pay
payments are not payments for the sale of gas, but instead are payments for the
pipeline purchaser's failure to purchase gas?' The take-or-pay obligation ensures
to the producer a continuous source of revenue to cover investment, operations, and
maintenance which will continue to be incurred, regardless of whether the purchaser
takes any gas." The take-or-pay payment is not intended to be a payment for gas
and is not part of the price of gas until it is applied to actual make-up gas at the
time of sale. 2 Thus, the court held that no royalty is due on take-or-pay payments
unless and until gas is actually produced and taken from the ground.3
The view set forth in Diamond Shamrock has been upheld in several recent cases.
In Killam Oil Co. v. Bruni,' the San Antonio Division of the Texas Court of
Appeals held that, absent production, no royalty is due on settlement proceeds
resulting from a breach of a take-or-pay provision in a gas purchase contract.S The
court held that under a standard oil and gas lease, take-or-pay payments do not
constitute a price paid for unproduced gas and do not have the effect of increasing




26. Id. at 1166.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1167.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1168.
33. Id.
34. 806 S.W.2d 264 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991).
35. Id at 267.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol46/iss4/8
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the price paid for gas that was previously taken26 The court held that these take-
or-pay payments are made when gas is not produced, and as such, bear no
royalty?7 The Killam Oil court followed the definition of "production" set forth in
Diamond Shamrock, i.e., that of actual production when the severance of minerals
from the formation occurs. 5
This definition of production is also found in Wyoming v. Pennzoil Co
9 The
Supreme Court of Wyoming held that royalty owners are not entitled, absent
production, to royalty on take-or-pay payments received by the lessee in a lease that
only provides for a royalty interest in the lessee's "production."' The court held
that "production" as used in a royalty clause of an oil and gas lease requires
severance of minerals from the ground and that royalties are due "only upon
physical extraction of the gas from the leased tract."'" The court recognized that
the parties could have included a provision requiring royalty on the proceeds of
take-or-pay payments.!' But absent such a provision, there is nothing in the lease
to indicate that such royalty payments are required. 3
In Hurd Enterprises. Ltd. v. Bruni," a royalty owner brought an action against
a lessee to recover royalties on proceeds of the lessee's settlement with a gas
purchaser for the purchaser's breach of a take-or-pay provision in the lessee's gas
contract. The lease provided that the royalty owner was to receive a one-eighth
royalty "if and when oil and gas was produced."45 Shortly after the gas contract
was signed, the gas market collapsed and the purchaser was buying only five
percent of the contract amount and refused to pay for the gas not taken. The lessee
negotiated a cash settlement and dismissed legal action against the gas purchaser.
The trial court concluded as a matter of law that the gas royalty clause was
applicable to the settlement payments and rendered judgment for the royalty
owner.4
The Texas Court of Appeals, however, upheld Killan Oil and decided that royalty
owners are not entitled to royalties on the settlement proceeds arising from the take-
36. Id. at 268.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 267 (quoting Diamond Shamrock, 853 F.2d at 1165).
39. Wyoming v. Pennzoil Co., 752 P.2d 975 (Wyo. 1988).
40. Id. at 981.
41. Id. at 979-80.
42. Id. at 981-82.
43. Id. at 982.
44. 828 S.W.2d 101 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992).
45. In the Hurd lease, the royalty clause was as follows:
The royalties to be paid by the lessee are ... (b) on gas, including casinghead gas and
all gaseous substance, produced from said land and sold or used off the premises or in the
manufacture of gasoline or other products therefrom, the market value at the mouth of the
well of one-eighth of the gas so sold or used provided that on the wells the royalty shall
be one-eighth of the amount realized from such sale.
Id. at 106.
46. Id. at 104.
1993]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1993
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
or-pay provisions.47 The Hurd Enterprises court followed the "law of the case"
doctrine. Under this doctrine, questions of law decided on appeal to a court of last
resort will govern the case throughout its subsequent stages.48 Therefore, following
the precedent set in Killam Oil, the Hurd Enterprises court held that, absent a
specific provision in a gas lease for royalties on lessee's take-or-pay settlements, a
gas royalty owner is not entitled to royalties on the lessee's proceeds from the
settlement of a dispu.te arising from a gas purchaser's breach of a take-or-pay
provision in a gas contract between a lessee and a purchaser.49 This rule applies
even when the settlement terminates the purchaser's recoupment rights."
The minority view regarding take-or-pay settlements is found in Frey v. Amoco
Production Co." In Frey, Frederick J. Frey and other owners of gas royalty
interests under a mineral lease commenced suit against Amoco Production Company
(Amoco), their lessee, to recover a royalty share of the proceeds received by Amoco
in settlement of take-or-pay litigation. The applicable oil and gas lease provided for
a "royalty on gas sold by the Lessee [of] one-fifth (1/5) of the amount realized at
the well from such sales."52 The district court judge granted partial summary
judgment after trial in favor of Amoco, following the reasoning of Diamond
Shamrock. The district court determined that the sale of gas cannot occur absent
physical production and severance of the gas. Thus, the district court followed the
majority view that take-or-pay payments do not constitute part of the sale price of
natural gas and the lessee is not required to pay royalties on take-or-pay proceeds. 3
Frey appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The
Court of Appeals decided that take-or-pay payments are a part of the "amount
realized" from the sale of gas under the lease, and thus such payments, received by
the lessee in settlement of the take-or-pay dispute with its pipeline purchaser for gas
not taken, are subject to the lessor's royalty.' On Petition for Rehearing, the Court
of Appeals withdrew a portion of its opinion and certified the question regarding
Frey's entitlement to a royalty interest on the proceeds of the take-or-pay settlement
to the Louisiana Supreme Court. This issue was one of first impression in the state
of Louisiana.
The Frey court, like the Oklahoma Court of Appeals in Roye Realty, examined
the basic purpose of an oil and gas lease. The court stated that it was cognizant that
the terms of a mineral lease are not intended to accommodate every eventuality.5
47. Id. at 105 (citing Killam Oil Co. v. Bruni, 806 S.W.2d 264, 268 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991)).
48. Id. at 106 n.7.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 106 n.8.
51. 603 So. 2d 166, 168 n.3 (La. 1992).
52. Id at 169 n.3. Thds royalty provision differs significantly from those in Diamond Shamrock
Exploration Co. v. Hodel, 853 F.2d 1159 (5th Cir. 1988), Hurd Enters. Ltd. v. Bruni, 828 S.W.2d 101
(Tex. Ct. App. 1992), and Killam Oil Co. v. Bruni, 806 S.WV.2d 264 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991), each of which
referred to "production."
53. Frey v. Amoco Prod. Co., 708 F. Supp. 783, 786 (E.D. La. 1989).
54. Frey v. Amoco Prod. Co., 943 F.2d 578, 580-84 (5th Cir. 1991).




The court reasoned that the parties likely did not contemplate that the producers
would receive take-or-pay payments in settlement of gas contract litigation. Thus,
the court looked
not at the parties' intent to provide expressly for take-or-pay payments,
but rather at the parties' general intent in entering an oil and gas lease,
viz., the lessor supplies the land and the lessee the capital and expertise
necessary to develop the land for the mutual benefit of both parties.56
The Frey court stated that an ambiguity in a royalty provision could not be
resolved without consideration of the practical and economic realities of the oil and
gas industry at the time the leases were negotiated, including the obligations of the
lessee to market the gas at the best possible price at the time the leases were
made.' In light of this rule, the court concluded that a royalty clause in an oil and
gas lease is rendered meaningless when the lessee receives a higher percentage of
the gross revenues generated by the leased property than contemplated by the
lease. 8 An economic benefit accruing from the leased land which is not expressly
excluded by the lease and is generated solely by virtue of that lease is to be shared
between the lessor and lessee in the fractional division contemplated by the lease. 9
The court in Frey discussed the implied duty to market. It held that a mineral
lessee is not under a fiduciary obligation to his lessor, but is bound to perform the
contract in good faith and to develop and operate the property leased as "a
reasonably prudent operator" for the mutual benefit of himself and his lessor ° The
court recognized that a lessee who failed to execute a take-or-pay clause in long-
term gas contract with a pipeline purchaser would likely be deemed to have acted
imprudently' Further, a producer who fails to renegotiate a long-term gas contract
in the face of the pipeline's financial inability to perform fully under the contract,
given the decline in demand and the rise in producer-pipeline litigation, would also
likely be deemed to have acted imprudently.' Because the duty to market is a
continuing one, the court determined that Amoco should not be able to enjoy the
benefits of the settlement while refusing to share the benefits with Frey. 3
Otherwise, "lessees would have an incentive to compromise volume prices under
their contracts or settlements with pipelines in exchange for favorable take-or-pay
terms."6
The court concluded in Frey that the take-or-pay payments made to Amoco in
settlement of the take-or-pay litigation formed part of the "amount realized" by
Amoco from the sale of gas and are subject to the lessor's royalty clause in favor
56. Id.
57. Id. (quoting Henry v. Ballard & Cordell Corp., 418 So. 2d 1334, 1337-38 (La. 1982)).
58. Id. at 174.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 176.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 181.
64. Id. at 182 (quoting Frey v. Amoco Production Co., 943 F.2d 578, 585 (5th Cir. 1991)).
1993]
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of Frey.3 The "amount realized" by Amoco was interpreted to include both the
total price paid by the pipeline-purchaser for the natural gas delivered, and the
"economic benefits" derived from the lease. The court held that the take-or-pay
payments are a part of the price paid to Amoco by the pipeline-purchaser for the
gas actually delivered under the gas contract.' The court held that the take-or-pay
proceeds constitute economic benefits which are derivative of Amoco's right to
develop and explore the leased property.67
The Frey court held that the price of gas taken under the contract includes not
only the contract price paid per unit of gas delivered, but also the sums paid in the
form of take-or-pay payments made in settlement of the take-or-pay litigation."
This is due to the fact that the producer is willing to negotiate a lower price in
exchange for the guarantee the pipeline will either take or pay for a specific
minimum quantity of natural gas, effectively lowering the price the producer charges
the pipeline per unit of gas.' Consequently, the price of gas and the royalty owed
thereon would be higher absent the take-or-pay provision." "Failure to characterize
these payments as part of the total price paid for gas sold under the contract is to
disregard the obvious economic considerations underlying the take-or-pay clause.""2
Also, the court reasoned that retention by Amoco of the entire take-or-pay payment
would permit Amoco to receive a part of the gross revenues from the property
greater than the fractional division contemplated by the lease,
The Louisiana Supreme Court recognized in Frey that contrary results have been
reached in other federal and state courts. The court attempted to reconcile this by
stressing that the mineral law of Louisiana evolved not from common law, but from
the Louisiana Civil Code, and that this was not the first time the court declined to
follow a majority view.3 Therefore, it can be argued that Frey is only influential
in the State of Louisiana and should not be given much weight by the Oklahoma
courts.
The Louisiana Supreme Court also distinguished Diamond Shamrock by noting
that in that case the federal court applied federal law to a federal offshore lease
expressing the lessee's royalty obligation as a fraction of the "amount or value of
production saved, reinoved, or sold."' 4 The royalty clause involved in Frey did not
involve a federal lease and provided royalty on "gas sold by the Lessee of 1/5 of
the amount realized."' Significantly, there was no express referral to "production."
65. Id. at 178.
66. Id.
67. Id.




72. Id. at 181.
73. Id. at 182. The Supreme Court of Louisiana recognized that it declined to follow the majority
view set forth in Henry v. Ballard & Cordell Corp., 418 So. 2d 1334 (La. 1982).
74. Frey, 603 So. 2d at 178 (quoting Diamond Shamrock, 853 F.2d at 1163).




IV. Contract Buy-Outs and Buy-Downs
In Gerald J. W. Bos & Co. v. Harkins & Co.,6 the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that payments under a settlement in cancellation of a take-or-pay gas
contract, a contract buy-out, are not subject to royalties.' In Harkins the owner of
a royalty interest in a force-pooled gas unit75 brought suit against the operator of
the unit and the gas pipeline company, after cancellation of the take-or-pay contract
between the operator and the pipeline company. The owner alleged that the operator
breached its fiduciary duty to royalty owners by canceling the contract. The Fifth
Circuit Court held that under Mississippi law, an owner of a royalty interest in a
force-pooled gas unit was a mere incidental beneficiary that had no rights under a
long-term, take-or-pay contract.9 Thus, the court held that no royalties were due
on amounts received as a result of the contract buy-out.'
V. Roye Realty & Developing, Inc. v. Watson
Roye Realty & Developing, Inc. v. Watson"' involved an action by R.D. and
Dorothy Watson, mineral lessors, who claimed that they were entitled to a share in
a settlement between their lessee-producer, Roye Realty and Development Co.
(Roye), and Arkansas Louisiana Gas Company (Arkla), a gas purchaser. The
Watsons contended that the "take-or-pay" provision in the gas purchase contract
entitled them to a share in the settlement based on the royalty provisions in the
leases held by Roye and the purchase contract between Roye and Arkla. Although
they were not parties to the gas purchase contract or settlement in question, the
Watsons contended that they were third-party beneficiaries of both. Roye and Arkla
admitted that the Watsons were entitled to be paid a royalty on gas produced and
sold. Roye and Arkla denied, however, that they had any liability to the Watsons
for Arkla's failure to purchase gas and the consequent take-or-pay liability. The trial
court granted summary judgment in favor of Roye and Arkla and the Watsons
appealed.
The Oklahoma Court of Appeals stated that oil and gas lessees have an implied
duty to market oil and gas that is within the "production capability" of the lessee.'
The court determined that this duty to market is intended to insure that lessors, such
76. 883 F.2d 379 (5th Cir. 1989).
77. Id. at 382.
78. Forced pooling, or compulsory pooling, operates under the idea that excessive drilling is
wasteful, but that all owners are entitled to a fair chance to recover hydrocarbons. Rather than deny
owners the right to drill, compulsory pooling requires owners within a designated area to pool their
interests together to achieve benefits from a single well. See generally 6 HOWARD R. WILLIAMs &
CHARLES J. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 905, at 13 (1987).
79. Harkins, 883 F.2d at 382.
80. Id.
81. No. 76,848 (Okla. Ct. App. filed July 14, 1992).
82. Id. slip op. at 2.
1993]
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as the Watsons, realize the benefit of their royalty." The court reasoned that the
take-or-pay clause allows a lessee to receive value for the exercise of its rights over
oil and gas within its production capability and to "market" the oil and gas without
severance or sale. 8 Thus, the court stated that the take-or-pay arrangement allows
the purchaser to refuse oil and gas that would otherwise generate a royalty by being
severed and sold.'
The Oklahoma Court of Appeals held that by either receiving payment for the
severance and taking of oil and gas by a purchaser or by granting a right to refuse
to take oil and gas that the purchaser was obliged to take, a lessee markets the oil
and gas.' The court held that the lessee thus incurs liability to pay the lessor a
royalty on the reyenue generated from the marketing.' The Oklahoma Court of
Appeals reversed the trial court's granting of a summary judgment in favor of Roye
and Arkla as premature.' The Watsons were held to be entitled to recognition of
their royalty interest in the payments received in connection with the marketing of
gas.' This broad holding implies that royalties must be paid not only when oil and
gas is actually produced, but any time money changes hands between a producer
and a gas purchaser, whether it be pursuant to a take-or-pay payment, a settlement
made in compromise thereof, or a contract buy-out.
The Oklahoma Court of Appeals cited no authority in support of its sweeping
opinion in Roye Realty. Therefore, the possible arguments that could be set forth
by producers and royalty interest owners and the authority that could be cited in
support for these arguments must be examined. This is important because the
Oklahoma Court of Appeals opinion offers little guidance in cases that do not
exactly mirror the facts of Roye Realty.
VI. Producer Arguments Against a Royalty Obligation
Producers have a number of arguments supporting their position that royalty
owners should be denied a royalty interest in take-or-pay payments and settlements.
These include (1) arguments focusing on the actual language in the lease; (2) the
fact that express language controls over implied covenants; and (3) the argument
that the payment does not involve the sale of gas. In addition there are practical
arguments in the producer's favor.
A. The Producer's Emphasis on the Definition of Royalty Interest and Production
A royalty interest is defined as "the landowner's share of production, free of












includes "a right to share in oil and gas if and when produced." Therefore, if a
royalty is related to the concept of production, then the controlling term in this issue
is "production." The lessors in Roye Realty entered into standard oil and gas leases
which limited the producer's obligation to pay royalties for gas produced and sold
from the leased premises." In order to be entitled to a royalty, the lessor must
show that payments received by the lessee are for gas produced and sold.' In such
a royalty clause, as a precondition of sale, the oil and gas must be physically
removed from the ground.' In fact, the oil and gas industry and most courts define
production in terms of physical severance of the minerals from the ground.' When
a pipeline makes take-or-pay payments, unless recoupment gas is physically taken,
there is no production and thus no royalty owed. Obviously it would be easier to
seek royalty payments under a royalty clause in which the terms "produced" or
"production" are not used.
B. Producer's Argument That Express Language Controls
Another compelling argument available to the producer is that a royalty owner
is free to require that the lease provide specifically that royalties are to be paid on
take-or-pay payments for gas not taken. Absent an express provision in the lease
to this effect, however, royalties should not be due until after the production of the
gas. 6 A fundamental precept of contract law in Oklahoma is that the law will not
make a better contract than the parties themselves entered into. The judicial function
of the court is to enforce the contract as it is written.' Under this argument, the
Oklahoma Court of Appeals has superimposed its own royalty obligation that is in
direct conflict with the clear, unambiguous language of the lease, and has essentially
rewritten the lease.
Producers may also argue that the Oklahoma Court of Appeals in Roye Realty
ignored the express language limiting the royalty obligation to payments for gas
produced and sold and instead created an expanded version of the implied duty to
91. Actually there were two oil and gas leases involved in this case. The exact royalty clauses were
not quoted in the Roye Realty decision which indicates that the court of appeals apparently gives no
weight to the parties' agreement. A copy of the leases have been obtained from counsel of record,
however, and they provided for royalties on gas "produced, saved and sold," and "produced and sold,"
respectively. These are similar to the example of a typical gas royalty provision found in 3 WILLAMs
& MEYERS, supra note 78, § 643.2, at 525-26 (1986).
92. Diamond Shamrock, 853 F.2d at 1167-68; see also Kaiser Francis Oil Co. v. Producer's Gas Co.,
870 F.2d 563, 570 (10th Cir. 1989).
93. See Golsen v. ONG Western, Inc., 756 P.2d 1209, 1216-18 (Okla. 1988); 52 OKLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 570.2 (West 1994). This definition of production is also utilized by the Texas courts in Monsanto Co.
v. Tyrrell, 537 S.W.2d 135, 137 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976). In Monsanto it was concluded that under Texas
law the term "production" was unambiguous and required the "actual physical extraction of the mineral
from the soil." l
94. Kramer, supra note 9, at 5.24-.25.
95. Id. at 5.21. Alternatively, the royalty clause could simply provide for the payment of royalty
on any payment received by the lessee, whether or not it involved the actual production or sale of gas.
96. Mandell v. Hariman Oil & Ref. Co., 822 S.W.2d 153 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991), reh'g denied, No:
01-90-00950-CV (Tex. Dec. 19, 1991), error denied, No. 01-90-00950-CV (Tex. July 1, 1992).
97. Great Western Oil & Gas Co. v. Mitchell, 326 P.2d 794, 798 (Okla. 1958).
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market gas. Under this reasoning, the court created a new implied obligation to
share in payments not attributable to gas production or sales.9 But a written
contract should control over conflicting implied terms.' Also, it has been
established in Oklahoma that parties may expressly limit the effect of any implied
obligation." °
C. Producer's Argument That a Take-or-Pay Payment Is Not a Payment for Gas
Yet another argument available to the producer is that a take-or-pay payment is
not the payment for gas, but is a commercial benefit for the producer to create a
minimum cash flow for the ongoing capital and operational costs that are incurred,
even when the purchaser fails to take any gas. The purpose of the take-or-pay clause
is to shield the producer from adverse market fluctuations and encourage investment
for exploration and development of oil and gas reserves."0 ' Royalties are arguably
not owed on such payments because they involve a sale of assets other than natural
gas."° Under this approach, to hold otherwise is to deny the lessee the benefit of
his bargain and entirely rewrite the oil and gas lease.
Producers may also argue that take-or-pay clauses are simply intended to
apportion the risks of natural gas production and sales between the buyer and the
seller. The producer bears the risk of production, and take-or-pay payments are
intended to compensate the producer for the risks associated therewith." To hold
otherwise would permit the lessor to be compensated for risks he never intended to
assume - he executed the lease to reap the benefits of royalties without having to
shoulder the risks of exploration, production and development."°
D. Practical Arguments Against Royalty Obligation
Purchasers who make take-or-pay payments may have the right to demand make-
up gas and the royalty paid on the make-up gas is usually determined by the market
value of the gas at the time the make-up gas is taken." If the market value of the
98. A "sale" is deemed to occur when gas enters the purchaser's pipeline. Wood v. TXO Prod.
Corp., 854 P.2d 880 (Okla. 1992) (petition for rehearing pending).
99. Central States Prod. Corp. v. Jordan, 86 P.2d 790 (Okla. 1939); I.T.I.O. v. Rosamond, 120 P.2d
349, 353 (Okla. 1941).
100. 5 EUGENE 0. KLNTz, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 60.2 (1991) ("The parties
may insert express provisions in the oil and gas lease which are inconsistent with and supersede any
implied obligation .... ").
101. A take-or-pay payment is not for purchase of gas but is intended as compensation to the
producer for dedicating ga, and standing ready to deliver. Golson v. ONG Western, Inc., 756 P.2d 1209
(Okla. 1988).
102. White, supra note 2, at 668.
103. Hurd Enterprises, Ltd. v. Bruni, 828 S.W.2d 101, 110 n.2 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) ("Because take.
or-pay provisions are intended to apportion the risks of natural gas production, it follows that the benefits
from those provisions should not be shared by royalty owners. Royalty owners are allowed to reap the
benefits through royalty payments without having to shoulder the associated risks of exploration,
production, and development.") (quoting WALTER CARDWELL, Do PRODUCERS OWE ROYALTY ON TAKE-
oR-PAY SETTLEMENTS? at S-7 (State Bar of Texas Advanced Oil, Gas, and Mineral Law Course 1991)).
104. Diamond Shamrock, 853 F.2d at 1167.




gas is higher at the time the purchaser elects to take make-up gas than when the
take-or-pay payment was made, a royalty based on the increased price is due from
the producer. The producer must make a second royalty payment on the difference
between the market value at the time of the make-up gas and the take-or-pay
payment. Thus, the producer will have to make two separate royalty payments to
satisfy its royalty obligation. Similarly, if the market value falls from the time the
take-or-pay payment is made and the time make-up gas is taken, the producer might
have to give the purchaser a refund on part of his take-or-pay payment."
This gives rise to a troubling problem with requiring royalties on take-or-pay
payments when no production is involved. How does one establish the value of the
royalties owed? The Oklahoma Court of Appeals in Roye Realty suggested that
royalties should be owed in any instance of payment by a gas purchaser to a
producer, whether the payment is for the severance and taking of oil and gas by the
purchaser, or for granting the purchaser the right not to have to take the oil and
gas." However, in many take-or-pay disputes, the contract is "bought out" or
renegotiated, or "bought down."'" The decision by the Oklahoma Court of
Appeals failed to even consider the underlying settlement agreement. The decision
in Roye Realty also failed to distinguish among the various types of settlements,
such as contract buy-downs, contract buy-outs, payments for accrued take-or-pay,
present payments with future make-up rights, and any combination of these
types. " In fact, the Roye Realty opinion was rendered without the benefit of
knowing the actual type of settlement entered into by the parties. Producers
therefore could argue that there must be a careful analysis of each type of settlement
in light of Oklahoma law and the lease language at issue before there can be a
determination of whether royalties are due.
VII. Royalty Owner Arguments
Royalty interest owners will, of course, agree with the Oklahoma Court of
Appeals' decision in Roye Realty, since it held that the lessor has a royalty interest
in any and all payments received in connection with the marketing of gas from the
leased premises. Although the opinion in Roye Realty sets forth no basis for the
court's holding, there are certainly available arguments. Producers may owe
royalties to royalty owners upon the receipt of take-or-pay payments under several
theories. The most convincing arguments in favor of the royalty owner center
around (1) the implied covenant to market and the reasonably prudent operator
standard; (2) the argument that take-or-pay payments are simply a marketing
substitute; (3) the theory of unjust enrichment and constructive trust; (4) the theory
106. Id.; White, supra note 2, at 670. If a take-or-pay dispute involves several wells, each having
different royalty owners, any method of allocating the settlement benefits will no doubt be questioned
as arbitrary by at least some of the owners.
107. Roye Realty v. Watson, No. 76,848, slip op. at 2 (Okla. Ct. App. filed July 14, 1992).
108. White, supra note 2, at 670.
109. See, e.g., ANR Pipeline Co. v. Wagner & Brown, 44 F.E.R.C. 61,057 (1988), reh'g denied,
49 F.E.R.C. 161,101 (1989).
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that the lessor acts as a third-party beneficiary; and (5) the theory that an alternate
interpretation of the term "production" should be followed in Oklahoma.
A. Royalty Owner's Emphasis on the Implied Duty to Market
An argument available to royalty owners is that the relationship between a lessor
and a lessee demands that the lessor share in the benefits derived from the
exploration and the development of minerals since the lessor contemplated such a
benefit when he granted the rights conferred upon the lessee in the oil and gas lease.
Under this theory, the issue of whether the lessor should share in take-or-pay
payments or settlements was arguably not contemplated by the parties at the time
they entered into the lease agreement."' Thus, the basic intent of the parties
should be examined rather than looking for an express intent regarding take-or-pay
payment. If this is the case, royalty owners may argue that the Oklahoma Court of
Appeals did not rewrite the clause in Roye Realty, but rather the court simply gave
recognition to the covenants implied in law to promote the special relationship
between the parties and preclude any disproportionate benefit to the lessee at the
expense of the lessor."'
Consistent with this is the argument that the implied duty to market mandates that
the lessor share in all payments derived from the marketing of gas from the leased
premises. The covenant is implied in order to carry out the intentions of the parties
and to insure a course of fair dealing between the parties. The implied duty to
market goes to the very purpose of the oil and gas lease."'
In McVicker v. Horn Robinson & Nathan,"' the Oklahoma Supreme Court held
that "the fact that the lessee has at one time invested money in it [the lease]
certainly would not warrant his holding it indefinitely without development,
marketing, or payment of rentals for its future speculative value.""' The McVicker
court held that if a lessee cannot market the oil and gas, there is no benefit to the
lessor and there is no purpose to be served under the terms of the lease.' The
duty to market contemplates the mutual benefit of the lessor and lessee.""
110. Frey v. Amoco Prod. Co., 603 So. 2d 166, 172 (La. 1992).
111. The implied covenant is a fiction used by the law in order to achieve a desirable result. An
implied covenant's terms have not been agreed upon by the parties consciously, and it is possible the
parties never even directed their attention to the matter. "The obligations are imposed, not by agreement
of the parties, but by operation of law." See MAURICE H. MERRILL, THE LAw RELATING TO COVENANTS
IMPLIED IN OIL AND GAS LEASES 27-28 (2nd ed. 1940); Patrick H. Martin, A Modern Look at Implied
Covenants To Explore, Develop and Market Under Mineral Leases 27 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N
177, 195 (1976).
112. The implied duty to market requires the lessee, once production is established, to diligently
market that production. Strange v. Hicks, 188 P. 347 (Okla. 1920).
113. 322 P.2d 410 (Olta. 1958).
114. Id. at 416.
115. Id. It has been stated that in an oil and gas lease, "[tihe lessor provides the land, the lessee
provides the capital and e:pertise, and both share, in some proportion, the product or value derived
therefrom." Fredrick R. Parker, Jr., The Lessor's Royalty and Take-or-Pay Payments and Settlements
Under Gas Sales Contracts in Louisiana, 47 LA. L. REV. 589, 596 (1987).




The lessee has the implied obligation to operate the lease as a "reasonably
prudent operator," meaning that he must have in his mind not only his interests, but
also the interests of his lessor to promote mutual advantage and profit."7 The
implied covenant to market requires the lessee to use due diligence and obtain the
best price reasonably available."' Therefore, royalty owners can argue that where
the sale price would have been higher without a take-or-pay provision in the lease,
a producer may not enjoy any benefit associated with his inclusion of such a provi-
sion in his gas sale contract, but refuse to share these benefits with the lessor."9
When the lessors no longer have a representative dealing at arms-length with a
purchasing pipeline, courts will intervene to enforce the implied covenant obligating
the lessee to market."
B. Take-or-Pay as a Marketing Substitute
Royalty owners will no doubt agree with the holding in Roye Realty that the take-
or-pay clause demonstrates that a lessee can receive value for the exercise of its
rights over the oil and gas without actual severance.' Since the lessee has a duty
to market gas,' it may be argued that the take-or-pay arrangement is simply a
marketing substitute or alternative to an actual severance and sale.'" The theory
is that, by receiving payment, whether it be for the severance and taking of gas by
a purchaser, or for granting a right to refuse to take the gas, the lessee "markets"
the gas. 4 If this is true, the royalty owner may argue that the lessee also incurs
liability to pay the lessor a royalty on the revenue generated from this market-
ing. 1
In a take-or-pay arrangement, a purchaser may make a take-or-pay payment and
refuse to take gas that would otherwise be subject to severance and sale. Often, by
putting off the sale of the gas, the lessor runs the risk that the demand for the gas
will fall and that pipelines will be unable to meet their obligations." Further,
117. KuIrrr supra note 100, § 60.3. The standard of performance uniformly required of the lessee
to comply with his implied duty to market oil or gas is the piudent operator standard under which the
lessee is required to exercise reasonable diligence or the degree of diligence that would be exercised by
an ordinary prudent operator having regard for the interests of both the lessor and lessee.
118. MERRILL, supra note I 11, at 212-13 ("[D]iligence in marketing should include the duty to
realize the highest price obtainable by the exercise of reasonable effort. If proper effort has been made
or if the record clearly demonstrates that effort would be inefficacious, the covenant is satisfied.").
119. White, supra note 2, at 674; Frey v. Amoco Prod. Co., 603 So.2d 166, 180-81 (La. 1992).
120. See Klein v. Jones, 980 F.2d 521, 532 (8th Cir. 1992).
121. Roye Realty v. Watson, No. 76,848, slip op. at 2 (Okla. Ct. App. filed July 14, 1992).
122. Id., slip op. at 3; Frey, 603 So. 2d at 175; KuNrz, supra note 100, § 60.1.
123. Roye Realty, No. 76,848, slip op. at 2.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. "The terms of the lease contemplate action and diligence on the part of the lessee." Martin,
supra note 111, at 200. "Encompassed within the lessees duty to market diligently is the obligation to
obtain the best price reasonably possible." Frey v. Amoco Prod. Co., 603 So. 2d 166, 175 (La. 1992).
However, the Oklahoma Court of Appeals in Roye Realty indicated that a lessee must market whenever
the ability to market exists: "In Oklahoma, oil and gas lessees have an implied duty to market the oil
and gas that is within the 'production' capability of the lessee." Roye Realty, No. 76,848, slip op. at 3
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although the gas is not sold, by leaving it in the ground, the gas becomes vulnerable
to drainage and reduction in reservoir pressure and could be worth less than if the
gas was sold in the present market."2 Royalty owners may also argue that, during
periods when no gas is taken and prices are rising, the lessors inability to enjoy the
higher prices must be compensated by the sharing of damages or other benefits
received by the lessee from the purchaser in the take-or-pay clause."
C. Royalties Owed Urer a Constructive Trust Theory in Order to Avoid Unjust
Enrichment
Although the issue of whether a lessor should share in take-or-pay payments or
settlements was not contemplated by the parties at the time they entered into the
lease agreement, an argument can be made that the lessor should be paid a royalty
if the failure to do so would result in the lessee being unjustly enriched.' A party
may recover on a theory of unjust enrichment only if there is an enrichment of
another coupled with a resulting injustice.'"
The proper basis for imposing a constructive trust is to prevent unjust enrich-
ment.' Arguably, the producer holds the royalty owner's share of any take-or-pay
benefits under a constr ctive trust for the royalty owner. However, the performance
required of a lessee under a lease is not measured by a fiduciary standard, and the
lease by itself does not cause the lessee to become a trustee for the lessor for any
special trust or confidence placed in the lessee.'
D. Royalty Owner's Argument that the Lessor Is a Third-Party Beneficiary
A royalty owner may argue that his relationship with the lessee is governed by
more than just the lease, and that the gas sales agreement is also important. In
analyzing whether a gas sale agreement constitutes a third-party beneficiary contract
in favor of the lessor, the lessor may argue that one must consider that "the lessee
entered into the gas contract at least, in part, to discharge its lease obligations to the
(emphasis added).
127. If operations do nct proceed with reasonable diligence, and drainage occurs, the lessor loses
both royalties and his contirgent interest in the gas drained. Martin, supra note 111, at 200. Gas is
treated as being marketed for purposes of other clauses in a lease, such as those which require minimum
payments to the lessor when no sales are occurring, when the lessee enters into a take-or-pay contract
and no gas is being taken. KuNTz, supra note 100, § 60.3. If this is the case, the lessor may argue that
he should be entitled to all of the benefits of the take-or-pay clause.
128. "The cooperative venture between lessor and lessee [requires] the lessee to market the gas to
secure the maximum benefit possible for both parties." David E. Pierce, Developments in Nonregulatory
Oil and Gas Law: Relationships, Contracts, Torts and the Basics, 41 INST. ON OIL & GAs L. & TAX'N
§ 1.07[1], at 1-72 (1990) (citing Henry v. Ballard & Cordell Corp., 418 So. 2d 1334, 1337 (La. 1982)).
"When an outside business motivation for acting, in what would otherwise be a foolish manner, can be
identified, the lessee is probably pursuing its interests at the expense of the royalty owner." Pierce, supra,
at 1-79; KuNz, supra note 100, § 60.3, at 137-38.
129. Klein v. Jones, 980 F.2d 521, 527 (8th Cir. 1992).
130. Teel v. Public Serv. Co., 767 P.2d 391, 398 (Okla. 1985).
131. G & M Motor Co. v. Thompson, 567 P.2d 80, 83 (Okla. 1977).




lessor... [indicating that] the gas contract was entered into for the benefit of the
lessor as well as the lessee."'' Although it never discusses the subject further, the
Oklahoma Court of Appeals in Roye Reality noted, prior to ruling in their favor, that
the royalty owners "contend that they are third-party beneficiaries" of both the gas
contract and the lessee's settlement agreement with the gas purchaser."3 Similarly,
it is noted that, while the Louisiana Supreme Court in Frey determined that "[a]
mineral lessee is not under a fiduciary obligation to his lessor," he nevertheless "is
bound to perform the contract in good faith and... as a reasonably prudent operator
for the mutual benefit of himself and his lessor."'3 s The royalty owners argument
is, therefore, not without basis.'"
E. Royalty Owner's Argument for an Alternate View of Production
Royalty owners may stress that there are different interpretations of "production"
as applied to the different clauses in an oil and gas lease. The definition of the term
"production" does not always require the physical act of marketing the products.
Instead, in many jurisdictions the discovery of gas capable of being produced in
paying quantities is sufficient for the purposes of a habendum clause, "7 governing
the term of the lease.' In Oklahoma, "production" under the habendum clause
may mean that the gas has been located underground and is capable of being
produced, but has not necessarily been brought to the surface for sale or market-
ing.'39 Therefore, under at least one provision in the lease, the term "production"
does not require the physical removal of the gas from the ground.
Royalty owners, therefore, may assert an argument that in states that follow such
a definition applicable to the habendum clause, production under other provisions
in the lease should also have a meaning that does not require the physical severance
of gas." But, this argument would not be applicable in states such as Texas,
which treats the term "production" in a habendum clause as requiring both discovery
and actual marketing. 4' Also, this argument does not carry much weight in the -
133. Pierce, supra note 128, at 1-75.
134. Roye Realty v. Watson, No. 76,848, slip op. at 2 (Okla. Ct. App. filed July 14, 1992).
135. Frey v. Amoco Prod. Co., 603 So. 2d 166, 174 (La. 1992).
136. It must be noted that, although there may be arguments present to support an oil and gas lessor
receiving third party beneficiary rights under a gas sales agreement, most courts do not advocate a
fiduciary, "highest good faith," or "utmost good faith" standard in any oil and gas implied covenant case.
"Unless the lease document itself creates in law a trust, or unless a relationship of trust and confidence
necessarily results from the lessor-lessee relationship, the standard of conduct of the lessee cannot be
appropriately categorized as fiduciary." Hurd Enterprises, Ltd. v. Bruni, 828 S.W.2d 101, 108 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1992).
137. The purpose of a habendum clause is to establish the duration of the interest granted, which
normally involves actual production to extend a lease past its primary term. See 2 KUNrZ, supra note
100, § 26.1, at 318; 4 id. § 46.4(e), at 24.
138. RiCHARD W. HEMINGWAY, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAs 277 (2d ed. 1983).
139. Gard v. Kaiser, 582 P.2d 1311 (Okla. 1978); McEvoy v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 624
P.2d 559 (Okla. App. 1980).
140. Kramer, supra note 9, at 5.26.
141. Id.
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context of the Roye Realty facts, since a basic landowner's royalty clause, and not
an habendum clause, is at issue. Therefore, the producer's strongest argument is still
that the standard industry definition of production requires actual physical severance
of the oil and gas from the ground. 4
F. Practical Arguments in Favor of Royalties Being Owed
Royalty owners have an argument that Oklahoma courts need not set out separate
and distinct rules depending on the type of settlement such as a contract buy-down,
contract buy-out, a payment for accrued take-or-pay, or present payments with
future make-up rights. Instead, an argument exists that the type of settlement is
irrelevant since the intent of the parties was that the royalty owner would share in
the benefits derived from the development of the leased premises. Under this
theory, if a distinction is made between certain types of settlements where producers
are allowed to retain all of one type of settlement payment, but share with royalty
owners in another type of settlement payment, producers would have an artificial
incentive to maximize the lump-sum settlement and minimize the future prices.'
Another argument that can be asserted is that, if the gas purchase contract entitles
the producer to retain take-or-pay proceeds even though the pipeline never makes
up the gas paid for, such proceeds have had the practical effect of increasing the
price paid for gas actaally produced, and the lessor should be entitled to a royalty
on these proceeds once the make-up right has terminated.' " Additionally, the
royalty owner might not have an opportunity to claim part of the settlement if the
settlement terminates the pipeline's right to make-up gas applicable to the period
covered by the settlement. Once the gas is produced, a new sales contract, which
establishes a price significantly lower than the price provided for by the take-or-pay
clause in dispute, mai be entered into.45
The problem is that these arguments appear to rely on fictions which exist only
to justify a desired result. The intent of the parties is best described in the oil and
gas lease, and current payments have nothing to do with the price of previously
produced gas. Further, there is no guarantee that prices will always be lower under
new gas sale agreements.
VIII. The Correct Approach
Although numerous arguments exist both for and against mandatory payments,
the correct approach to the problem of whether, in the absence of production,
royalties are due on take-or-pay payments is the majority view set out in Diamond
Shamrock, Killam Oil, and Harkins." The logic of these opinions centers around
142. This argument was persuasive in Diamond Shamrock Exploration Co. v. Hodel, 853 F.2d 1159
(5th Cir. 1988), and Killam Oil Co. v. Bluni, 806 S.W.2d 264, 267 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992).
143. Ernest E. Smith, Royalty Issues: Take-or-Pay Claims and Division Orders, 24 TULSA L.J. 509
(1989).
144. Hurd Enterprises, Ltd. v. Bruni, 828 S.W.2d 101, 106 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (citing I ERNEST
E. SMrrH & JAcQUELINE LANG WEAVER, TExAS LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 4.6(E)(6), at 215 (1991)).
145. Id.




the idea that royalties are due only when gas is actually produced and sold, and not
before. In most instances, the parties in an oil and gas lease have agreed that
royalties are to be paid on the sale proceeds of production. In the majority of
jurisdictions, the common industry definition of "production" requires the minerals
to be physically severed from the ground. In the take-or-pay settlement situation, the
payments do not involve the actual production of oil and gas, and thus royalties
should not be incurred. 7 The Oklahoma Court of Appeals decision in Roye Realty
is in direct conflict with Oklahoma Supreme Court decisions and industry standards
defining "production" and "sale."
In Roye Realty, the royalty owner's strongest argument is that royalties are due
under the implied duty to market. However, it must be remembered that the royalty
clause in Roye Realty expressly stipulated that royalty was to be paid for gas "pro-
duced and sold" or used off the premises. " It is significant that the royalty clause
involved in Frey, the primary support for the royalty owner's argument, did not
contain the express requirement of "production." There is a strong argument that the
use of Frey as support for royalties in Roye Realty is inadequate or inappropriate
since the wording of the royalty clauses contained in the Frey and Roye Realty
leases are so dissimilar. Express provisions in the lease should be given deference
over implied covenants and the courts should not engage in rewriting provisions in
a lease that were entered into at ann's length negotiation and in good faith by
competent parties. The implied duty to market gas will be applicable when the
lessee actually produces the gas, and at that time the lessor will be paid his royalty.
Also, the argument presented in Roye Realty that a take-or-pay arrangement is a
marketing substitute is a fiction. A take-or-pay arrangement may be a substitute for
the pipeline-purchaser's obligation to buy gas, but in reality this is not marketing at
all. 49 No gas is sold when there is only a take-or-pay settlement. The royalty
owners can argue that royalties should be incurred on payments made in settlement
of take-or-pay litigation since the lessor runs the risk that demand will fall (and
consequently the gas will be worth less) by putting off the sale of gas. However,
the opposite could also be true - demand could rise and the lessor could receive
the benefit of higher prices. For this reason, the Roye Realty rule is too broad. The
courts must be able to examine the unique facts present in each case involving a
take-or-pay arrangement in order to determine if royalties are owed.
The weakest arguments in favor of royalty owners are that royalties should be
paid under unjust enrichment, constructive trust, or third-party beneficiary theories.
Arguably, there is no unjust enrichment since take-or-pay payments are to compen-
& Co. v. Harkins & Co., 883 F.2d 379, 382 (5th Cir. 1989).
147. It is becoming well accepted that royalties are not payable upon the receipt of take-or-pay
payments, but rather when the applicable make-up gas is taken. See White, supra note 2, at 663. Why,
then, should royalties be payable upon a settlement which involves no production? Further, if royalties
are owed, producers might be less motivated to settle.
148. Roye Realty v. Watson, No. 76,848, slip op. at 1 (Okla. Ct. App. filed July 14, 1992).
149. Treating a take-or-pay payment as production would affect other clauses in the lease. Would
such a payment extend the term of a lease which otherwise would expire in the absence of production
in paying quantities?
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sate the producer-seller for being willing and able to provide a certain amount of
gas and provide him with cash to cover continuing operation costs. Without these
payments, the producer would be financially unable to explore for or continue
production. The take-or-pay arrangement also benefits the pipeline-purchaser by
giving it flexibility in the amount of gas taken and the ability to control gas
reserves. In most instances, the producer and the purchaser probably do not consider
the royalty owner to be a benefactor under their agreement. And, according to
Eugene Kuntz, in his A Treatise on the Law of Oil and Gas, the lease by itself does
not cause the lessee to become a trustee; if only the lease is considered, his
performance is not measured by a fiduciary standard."5
Still, the royalty owners may argue that the intent of the parties when entering
a take-or-pay arrangement was that the royalty owner would share in all benefits
derived by the lessee under the arrangement. The express provisions in the lease,
however, show that tha parties bargained for royalty only when there is production.
Arguably, the courts should not infer that the intent of the parties is directly
contrary to the express provisions in the lease. If the parties intended that royalties
be paid on take-or-pay payments or payments in settlement of take-or-pay litigation,
they could have expressly provided so in the royalty clause.
The most striking problem with the Oklahoma Court of Appeals opinion in Roye
Realty is that its simple approach to the problem establishes a new, overly broad
policy applicable to all take-or-pay settlements, without consideration to any of the
unique facts which exist under the various disputes involved, and without consider-
ation of the underlying lease and settlement agreement. With the explosion of take-
or-pay litigation which occurred in the 1980s that led to many types of settlements
between producers and pipelines, the Roye Realty decision will have a tremendous
impact in Oklahoma. Other cases with these unique and complex questions of law
will surely follow Roye Realty. Therefore, it is necessary that the Oklahoma courts
deal with the matter in an orderly fashion, and distinguish between the various types
of take-or-pay disputes and settlements. Many take-or-pay disputes result in the
renegotiation of a contract, or a contract buy-out rather than a cash settlement. The
computation of royalties in these situations would be difficult, if not impossible. Yet
the broad mandate of Roye Realty fails to provide for a careful analysis of each type
of settlement with consideration of the language in the lease. Instead, Roye Realty
provides that the receipt by the producer of any type of payment in lieu of take-or-
pay litigation is an azt of "marketing" the gas and a liability for royalties is
incurred. This approach simply cannot be justified under every fact situation.
IX. Conclusion
The Oklahoma Supreme Court has the opportunity to enable the law pertaining
to royalty obligations under take-or-pay settlements to be developed in an orderly
fashion. The Oklahoma Court of Appeals decision in Roye Realty"' was ill-
150. KuNri, supra note. 100, § 59.3.




conceived and lacked a basis in traditional oil and gas law. If left intact, future
cases involving different royalty clauses and significant facts may not be fairly
considered. Thus, the opinion would create more problems than it would solve. The
Oklahoma Supreme Court should, at the very least, require that applicable facts in
Roye Realty be developed. If the settlement in the case involved no production
which can fairly be attributed to the settlement payment, the court should rule that
no royalties are owed.
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